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Abstract
We investigate whether nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs share similar observable
and unobservable skills. In JLE 23:649-680, 2005 ‘Jacks-of-all-Trades’ model of
entrepreneurship, individuals with more diverse academic and occupational training are
more likely to become entrepreneurs, while more narrowly trained individuals become
employees. Data on college graduates from a single university show that observed
diverse skills increase the probability that the graduate will open both for-profit
and nonprofit venture. Positive correlation in the errors that jointly affect for-profit
and nonprofit start-ups is consistent with the existence of an unobserved entrepreneurial
skill, a key factor underlying Lazear’s theory.
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1. Introduction
In contrast with for-profit firms, nonprofit entrepreneurs are legally prohibited from
taking profit from their operations. Despite this constraint on profit distributions,
many individuals devote their entrepreneurial talents to founding and operating non-
profit firms. One explanation advanced for the existence of nonprofit firms contends
that in markets where the customer requires unverifiable service quality, customers
will attach more credibility to promised quality from providers that are not motivated
by profit (Hansmann 1980; Easley and O’Hara 1983; Holtmann 1983; Chillemi and Gui
1991; Mark 1996; Bilodeau and Slivinski 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer 2001)1. A second
explanation attributes willingness to provide public goods at less than the opportunity
cost of time, as with pro bono or legal aid services, to utility from doing work in the
public interest (Weisbrod 1983; Preston 1989; Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999; Ghatak
and Mueller 2011). Similarly, willingness to provide these services could be due to
non-pecuniary motives such as altruism or philanthropy (Hansmann 1980; Young
1986; James 1987; Gassler 1998). Finally, provision of public goods may be a means to
exploit tax advantages (Weisbrod 1983). To date, little attention has been paid to the
role of entrepreneurial ability in nonprofit service provision except for the argument
that career experiences may lower the cost of nonprofit entrepreneurship (Bilodeau
and Slivinski 1996; Lakdawalla and Philipson 2006).
Lazear (2004, 2005) advanced the “Jacks-of-All-Trades” theory of entrepreneurship.
By exploiting returns to scale from entrepreneurial talent, the earnings from the
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owner’s share of firm profits can dominate earnings expected from working for some-
one else. The main implication is that the pattern of human capital investment differs
across entrepreneurs and those in paid employment—entrepreneurs acquire more var-
ied skills necessary to run a business while those they employ specialize in more
occupation-specific and narrowly focused skills. Several studies have provided empirical
evidence that for-profit entrepreneurs are generalists with diverse skills, whereas paid
workers are specialists (e.g., Wagner 2003, 2006; Silva 2007; Åstebro and Thompson
2011; Stuetzer et al. 2013; Lechmann and Schnabel 2014)2. Exceptions are the study by
Hartog et al. (2010) who find that variety of skill sets does not affect the choice for
entrepreneurship but positively affects entrepreneurial income and the study by Hessels
et al. (2014) who find contradictory results between several measures of variety of skill
sets and business startups among nascent entrepreneurs.
Lazear’s Jacks-of-all-trades theory focuses on monetary compensation as the motiv-
ation for choosing entrepreneurship. However, studies commonly find that entrepre-
neurs earn less than what they could earn as salaried employees (Hamilton 2000;
Åstebro and Thompson 2011) or on similarly risky common stock (Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). Hamilton (2000) explained entrepreneurs’ lower lifetime earn-
ings by a presumed hedonic return from business ownership. Åstebro and Thompson
(2011) argue that entrepreneurs have a taste for variety for which they are willing to
pay with lower earnings. Consistent with these arguments, Benz and Frey (2004, 2007)
found that the self-employed had higher job satisfaction than employees because of
their greater independence. Benz (2009) argues that when non-pecuniary factors are
added as an additional return to entrepreneurship into Lazear’s model, entrepreneur-
ship is best characterized as a nonprofit-seeking activity3.
There may be a possible link between varied career experience and entrepreneurship
simply because those who are less risk averse are more likely to change their jobs and
more likely to become entrepreneurs (Åstebro and Thompson 2011) or because those
with lower ability are more likely to change their jobs and thus more likely to enter
self-employment (Evans and Leighton 1989). However, Åstebro and Thompson (2011)
do not find any significant correlation between lower unobserved ability and earnings
or entrepreneurship.
Although there are different views about the issue on whether entrepreneurship is a
profit- or nonprofit-seeking activity, the diversity of skill sets from the Lazear’s Jacks-
of-all-trades theory in itself is important to understand the nature of entrepreneurial
human capital. This is because taking non-monetary benefits into account does not
change the central prediction that entrepreneurs should be generalists whereas em-
ployees should be specialists. Diverse skill sets are essential for running an efficient op-
eration, whether it is to maximize profit from market sales or to minimize costs of
producing the desired level of a public good. Even if an employer places a value more
on non-pecuniary benefits from entrepreneurship, his business should continue to grow
or at least remain in business so that he can get nonmonetary utility from entrepre-
neurship. To do so, he would have to exploit his entrepreneurial talent. In this view,
the diverse skill sets should be considered important for both nonprofit and for-profit
settings. Accordingly, we predict that diverse skills should have a positive effect on the
choice of both nonprofit and for-profit startups over the alternative of working for
someone else.
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This study investigates whether nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs share similar
observable and unobservable skills. Observable entrepreneurial skill is presumed to be
indicated by more diverse time investments in educational and labor market skills. We
further test whether unobservable entrepreneurial skills that are presumed to be im-
portant in for-profit ventures are important for nonprofit ventures as well.
We test the hypotheses using data drawn from a random sample of 25,000 Iowa State
University (ISU) alumni who graduated between 1982 and 2006 with a Bachelor’s
degree. We first confirm that for-profit entrepreneurs are generalists with more occu-
pational diversity while paid-employees are specialists, consistent with Lazear (2005).
Furthermore, our empirical finding shows that a more diverse skill set increases the
choice of nonprofit start-ups, supporting our hypothesis that nonprofit entrepreneurs
are also “Jacks-of-All-Trades”. Lastly, we find that unobserved factors that jointly affect
for-profit and nonprofit startups are positively correlated, consistent with the presence
of a common observed entrepreneurial skill that leads to both for-profit and nonprofit
entrepreneurial success.
Our study suggests that nonprofit entrepreneurs are drawn from a common pool of
entrepreneurial talents that are valuable in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.
Although the motivations between for-profit and nonprofit startups may differ, the skill
sets are similar. People who are atypically more likely to start a for-profit business given
their observable skills are also more likely to start a nonprofit enterprise, and vice versa.
Hence, our results suggest that public policies aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship
should focus on providing diverse skills and experiences. However, entrepreneurial
training need not differ between for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurs as the two sec-
tors will draw from the same pool of entrepreneurial talent.
2. Model and hypotheses
In Lazear’s (2005) model, human capital can be decomposed into two skills, x1 and x2.
4
Employees receive an amount equal to their skill level in the market activity, so they
specialize in their best skill and earn w =max[x1, x2]. In contrast, entrepreneurs must
be able to evaluate employees with specializations in either human capital subcomponent,
and they can only do that effectively if they have skills in both areas. Consequently, expected
earnings for an entrepreneur will depend on the extent of their weakest skill: λmin[x1, x2].
The parameter λ measures entrepreneurial skill that will be unobserved in general.
An individual will become an entrepreneur if λmin[x1, x2] >max[x1, x2]. That is, for
any given λ, those with more balanced skills will choose to become entrepreneurs,
while those with specialty in either one skill become specialists. Another implication of
Lazear’s model is that a larger endowment of the unobserved entrepreneurial skill λ
increases the probability of becoming a for-profit entrepreneur.
To the extent that nonprofit entrepreneurs are also trying to maximize output, that
same unobservable skill could be critical in the probability of starting a successful non-
profit venture. To explore that possibility, we need to add nonprofit entrepreneurship
as an additional occupational choice in Lazear’s framework.
We assume that an individual i is faced with the nonexclusive choices of creating a
nonprofit start-up, creating a for-profit start-up, or working for someone else. His ob-
jective is to maximize the possible returns from devoting his time to working at one or
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possibly more than two alternatives under time constraints. The returns include pecu-
niary benefits from either for-profit start-up or working for someone and non-
pecuniary benefits from nonprofit start-up. He possesses two types of skills, x1 and
x2. If H is the amount of time one can invest in skills and time translates directly into
a quantity of human capital, a specialists’ stock of skill will be either [H,0] or [0,H].
Entrepreneurs will try to equalize their holdings of both skills so that their skill stock
will be H2 ;
H
2
 
.
Following Lazear (2005), expected market productivity from wage work will involve spe-
cializing in his best skill, and so his wage is w =max[x1, x2]. His expected returns from a
for-profit venture depend on the extent of his weakest skill: Y f ¼ λf min x1; x2½  ¼ λf H2 .
Similarly, his return from a nonprofit venture depends on his weakest skill, but it is the cash
equivalent non-pecuniary return to nonprofit entrepreneurship which we assume is propor-
tional to the output of the nonprofit: Yn ¼ λn min x1; x2½  ¼ λn H2 . It can also include per-
quisites such as better working environment, free meals, shorter workdays, or longer
vacations.
Working time is assumed to be the only input required for production with Tf being
time devoted to a for-profit enterprise and Tn being time devoted to a nonprofit ven-
ture. In efficiency units, entrepreneurial time allocated to the nonprofit and for-profit
sectors is En = λnTn and Ef = λfTf, respectively. Production in the for-profit (F(Ef )) and
nonprofit (G(En)) firms increases ithe unobservable entrepreneurial skill at a decreasing
rate, so FEf > 0; GEn > 0 ; FEfEf < 0 and GEnEn < 0 . Diminishing marginal returns to
time in each sector raises the possibility of working in more than one sector at once.
Each individual solves t sector choice problem:
Max λf min x1; x2½ F λf T f
 þ λn min x1; x2½ G λnTnð Þ þ max x1; x2½ Tw  ð1Þ
subject to Tf þ Tn þ Tw ¼ T ; Tj≥0 for j = f, n,w
where f, n,w indicate for-prof entrepreneurship, nonprofit entrepreneurship, and paid
employment, respectively.
The Lagrangian is
L ¼ Y f F λf T f
 þ YnG λnTnð Þ þ wTw−θ Tf þ Tn þ Tw−T  (2)
The first order conditions with respect to Tf, Tn, and Tw are:
Y f λf FTf −θ ≤ 0 ð ¼ 0 if Tf > 0Þ ð3Þ
YnλnGTn−θ ≤ 0 ð ¼ 0 if T n > 0Þ ð4Þ
w−θ≤0 ð ¼ 0 if T w > 0Þ ð5Þ
Optimal allocation of time among the three choices depends on the marginal product
of time, entrepreneurial talent, and returns. The individual will start a for-profit enter-
prise if the first equation holds with equality, he will start a nonprofit enterprise if the
second condition holds, and he will engage in wage work if the third equation holds.
The individual will devote time to both a for-profit and nonprofit enterprises if
Y f
Y n
¼ λf
H
2
λn H2
¼ λnGTn
λf FTf
ð6Þ
which implies that λ2f FTf ¼ λ2nGTn . Equation (6) indicates that when the individual
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starts both for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises, he will allocate time across the two
sectors so that the marginal products of the last unit of time expended in each enter-
prise are equal.
If the individual specializes in wage work only, we have that:
Y f λf FTf < w ¼ H ð7Þ
YnλnGTn < w ¼ H ð8Þ
An individual will never engage in both wage work and entrepreneurship. To see this,
note that to get a return from entrepreneurship, he will need to spread his human cap-
ital investments across the two skill types, meaning that his human capital will equal H2 .
At least one of the following conditions must hold to both work for a wage and be an
entrepreneur:
Y f λf FTf ¼ λ2f
H
2
FTf ¼ w ¼
H
2
ð9Þ
YnλnGTn ¼ λ2n
H
2
GTn ¼ w ¼
H
2
ð10Þ
But the wage worker could have specialized in human capital, and so the wage will be
less than H in both cases, and so the individual would not have chosen to become an
entrepreneur.
In practice, virtually everyone will engage in wage work at some time over the life
cycle. For individuals aspiring to entrepreneurship, wage work is an investment in skills
to be used later as an entrepreneur. On the other hand, the theory demonstrates that a
higher draw on the unobservable λ gives the decision maker an incentive to become
both a for-profit and a nonprofit entrepreneur over the alternative of working for a
wage. An important implication is that if λf and λn are positively correlated, an increase
in either λf or λn will increase the probability of both types of entrepreneurship and de-
crease the probability of wage work.
Based on the discussion above, four testable hypotheses emerge:
Hypothesis 1: An individual with more diverse skills is more likely to become a
for-profit entrepreneur.
Hypothesis 2: An individual with more diverse skills is more likely to become a
nonprofit entrepreneur.
Hypothesis 3: More diverse skills decrease the probability of entering paid-employment.
Hypothesis 4: Unobserved entrepreneurial talent will raise the probability of both
for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurship, and so there will be a positive correlation
in the error terms derived from models of for-profit and nonprofit entry.
3. Data
The empirical analysis is based on Iowa State University (ISU) Bachelor’s degree alumni
survey data, which is an excellent and novel source of data for conducting research on
non-profit entrepreneurship. The 5,416 usable responses are obtained from a random
sample of 25,000 ISU alumni who graduated between 1982 and 2006. The data set
provides detailed information on respondents’ employment histories, for-profit and
nonprofit business start-ups, and socioeconomic characteristics. In addition, these data
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were matched with each student’s academic record, so we were able to get information
on college major(s), courses taken inside and outside of the major, and even high
school rank.
3.1. Endogenous variables
Nonprofit entrepreneurs are defined as those who ever started a nonprofit organization
during their career. Likewise, for-profit entrepreneurs are identified as having ever initi-
ated a for-profit enterprise. Individuals working for salary or wages at the time of the
survey are categorized as wage workers. This means that some respondents fall into
more than one category. Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents who fall either
one or both categories of nonprofit and for-profit start-up. About 45% of nonprofit en-
trepreneurs (or 63 out of 140 nonprofit entrepreneurs) also become for-profit entrepre-
neurs. This distribution suggests that entrepreneurial skills that lead to for-profit start-
up could also play a role in the decision to start a nonprofit venture.
We label as entrepreneurs individuals who started as wage workers but eventually be-
came full-time entrepreneurs because wage work can serve as a means of acquiring ne-
cessary human capital for the venture (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1996; Lakdawalla and
Philipson 2006). On the other hand, if an individual started a for-profit or nonprofit
venture but returned to wage work later, we include them in both the wage worker and
entrepreneurial occupations. That definition seems consistent with the Lazear frame-
work where diversity of occupational experiences may be selected as a means to be-
coming an entrepreneur later, while individuals who misjudge their entrepreneurial
venture and switch to wage work are clearly choosing entrepreneurial and wage work
as separate occupations. In the data, 27% of the for-profit entrepreneurs and 20% of the
not-for-profit entrepreneurs left their enterprises and returned to wage work.
3.2. Explanatory variables
The theory says that entrepreneurs will invest in balanced skills to manage their
employed specialists efficiently. For our analysis, we include three measures of entre-
preneurial skills as indicators of a balanced skill set. In the ISU alumni survey, respon-
dents were asked to report the number of different jobs held since obtaining Bachelor’s
degree. After reporting the total number of different jobs, respondents subsequently
Table 1 Number and percent of for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurs in ISU alumni data
For-profit entrepreneur?
Nonprofit entrepreneur? No Yes Total
No 4,467 809 5,276
Row% (84.7%) (15.3%) (100%)
Column% [98.3%] [92.8%] [97.4%]
Yes 77 63 140
Row% (55%) (45%) (100%)
Column% [1.7%] [7.2%] [2.6%]
Total 4,544 872 5,416
Row% (83.9%) (16.1%) (100%)
Column% [100%] [100%] [100%]
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answered the question, “what occupations have you had in these jobs? Check all that
apply.” Accordingly, we first measure the balanced skill set by the total number of dif-
ferent occupations associated with those jobs held since graduation, which is denoted
by Occupations. The second measure is the total number of industries in which the jobs
were located, denoted by Industries5. Higher values of these variables reflect more bal-
anced skills. We include an academic skill set as a third measure of a balanced skill set
as Lazear (2005) found that students with a more balanced university curriculum were
more likely to enter entrepreneurship while those with general curricula chose to work
for someone else. We measure an academic skill set by the difference between total
number of courses taken in the major and the average number of courses taken in
other departments, defined as Course-specialization. Lower value of this measure indi-
cates a more diverse academic program.
As additional control variables, we include parental business experience because entrepre-
neurial ability can be passed from parents to their offspring (Lentz and Laband 1990). A set
of other control variables includes age, age-squared, gender, race, marital status at gradu-
ation, parental education, close friends’ business experience, and information on academic
record such as high school rank, college GPA, and college dummies.
Table 2 shows some descriptive evidence on how the nonprofit and for-profit entrepre-
neurs are similar and how entrepreneurs in either sector differ from paid-employees. First
of all, individuals who became for-profit entrepreneurs have, on average, higher number of
Table 2 Summary statistics
Mean [Std]
Nonprofit entrepreneurship For-profit entrepreneurship Wage work
Balanced skill sets of human capital
Occupations 2.06 [1.59] 2.22 [1.70] 1.62 [1.12]
Industries 2.14 [1.36] 2.06 [1.22] 1.70 [1.06]
Course_specialization 13.41 [8.05] 12.83[7.26] 13.51 [7.21]
Other human capital
Male 0.61 [0.49] 0.67 [0.47] 0.59 [0.49]
Married at graduation 0.14 [0.35] 0.11 [0.31] 0.10 [0.30]
White 0.94 [0.24] 0.94 [0.24] 0.95 [0.22]
Mother education 4.58 [1.59] 4.53 [1.56] 4.72 [1.54]
Father education 4.65 [1.71] 4.83 [1.80] 4.91 [1.72]
Either of parents started business 0.57 [0.50] 0.56 [0.50] 0.47 [0.50]
Close friends started business 0.29 [0.46] 0.28 [0.45] 0.47 [0.50]
High school rank 68.30 [33.14] 62.18 [34.62] 70.59 [31.16]
Cumulative GPA 3.02 [0.57] 2.96 [0.58] 3.05 [0.59]
Age at graduation 23.82 [3.70] 24.10 [4.06] 23.50 [3.04]
Current age 41.01 [7.35] 40.50 [7.94] 36.88 [8.47]
College
Agriculture and Life Sciences 0.22 [0.42] 0.16 [0.37] 0.18 [0.39]
Business 0.18 [0.38] 0.20 [0.40] 0.16 [0.37]
Design 0.15 [0.36] 0.18 [0.38] 0.17 [0.38]
Engineering 0.13 [0.34] 0.09 [0.29] 0.07 [0.25]
Human Sciences 0.23 [0.42] 0.26 [0.44] 0.29 [0.45]
Note: The number in the square bracket is standard deviation.
Cho and Orazem IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 7 of 152014, 3:4
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/4
occupations than paid-employees. The average number of different occupations held by
for-profit entrepreneurs is 37% higher than that for paid-employees. Similarly, the average
number of different occupations held by nonprofit entrepreneurs is 27% higher than paid-
employees. For-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurs also average more industries of employ-
ment compared to wage workers. The pattern is less clear cut with respect to academic
diversity. For-profit entrepreneurs took the broadest academic programs, but there were no
substantial differences between nonprofit entrepreneurs and wage workers.
On average, nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs were from families that owned a
business and had less educated parents than did wage workers. Entrepreneurs were
weaker students in both high school and college. Entrepreneurs came from all colleges,
and so choice of major did not dictate a path to entrepreneurship.
4. Methodology
We test our hypotheses in the context of a trivariate probit model which allows correl-
ation in the errors among three choices. The empirical model is based on the latent
regression form:
yj ¼ Xj βj þ Zjγ j þ εj; ð11Þ
yj ¼ 1 yj > 0
 	
; j ¼ f ; n;w ð12Þ
where j = n for nonprofit startup, f for for-profit startup, and w for paid employment.
The latent variable yj represents the value of an occupation j relative to other alterna-
tives. The vector X contains two occupational diversity measures (Occupations, Indus-
tries) and one academic skill measure (Course_specialization). As control variables, Z is
a vector of demographic variables that potentially alter the relative return to the three
occupations as mentioned in the previous section.
The error structure of the trivariate probit is:
εn
εf
εw
0
@
1
AeN
0
0
0
0
@
1
A;
1 ρnf ρnw
ρnf 1 ρfw
ρnw ρfw 1
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5 ð13Þ
For identification reasons, the variance of each εj must equal 1. Subject to that
normalization, we can identify the three correlation coefficients (ρnf, ρnw, ρfw) which
represent the extent to which unobserved covariates jointly determine the occupations.
Importantly, the normalization preserves the signs of these cross equation correlations.
Because entrepreneurial skill is unobservable to the researchers, it serves as the primary
source of error. The sign of the correlation between εn and εf will depend on the cor-
relation between the unobserved λf and λn. We expect a positive correlation between
the incentives to start for-profit and nonprofit start-ups due to the common unobserv-
able entrepreneurial talents that are presumably valued in both sectors (ρnf > 0). On the
other hand, we expect that the unobserved skills that lead to specialization and wage
work are negatively correlated with the unobserved general skills that enhance entre-
preneurship and so ρnw < 0 and ρfw < 0.
Cho and Orazem IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 8 of 152014, 3:4
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/4
5. Empirical results
The results from the trivariate probit model are reported in Table 3. The first three col-
umns include no covariate controls. The second three columns add pre-college charac-
teristics. The next three columns include more controls for college records. The last
three columns report marginal effects associated with the third specification. Higher
value of Occupations or Industries indicates a more balanced skill set while lower value
of Course_specialization indicate a more diverse skill set. The main implications of the
results for occupational choices are consistent across different specifications.
5.1. Do nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs share common skill sets?
Before getting to our main findings, we first investigate whether nonprofit entrepre-
neurs and for-profit entrepreneurs are more similar to one another than to wage
workers. In the second set of results, 5 of 8 covariates have common signs across the
for-profit and not-for-profit entrepreneurial choices. In the third set of results, 13 of 16
covariate pairs have common signs across the two choices. Parental education and high
school rank are the only covariates that have different signs across the two entrepre-
neurship groups. The clearest distinction in factors that raise the probability of becom-
ing either entrepreneur type while lowering the probability of wage work are growing
up with a family or having friends that owned a business, being a member of a minority
group, being married at graduation, having an engineering major, and getting older.
We now turn to the main finding on the relationship between balanced skill sets and
occupational choice. Having more diverse job experiences across Occupations and
across Industries raises the probability of starting both for-profit and nonprofit enter-
prises compared to wage work. As we add more controls, the effects of Occupations
and Industries decrease slightly in magnitude but they still raise the probability of both
types of entrepreneurship while lowering the probability of wage work, consistent with
the predictions from Lazear’s “Jacks-of-All-Trades” theory. More precisely, adding one
more occupation held since graduation raises the probability of nonprofit startups by
0.2% and the probability of initiating a for-profit venture by 2.7%. Meanwhile, it lowers
the probability of working for wages by 2.9%. Likewise, increasing prior sectoral work
experience by one more industry increases the probability of nonprofit entrepreneur-
ship by 0.3% and for-profit startup by 1.6%, but it reduces the chance to become a wage
worker by 2%. In contrast with Lazear’s (2005) findings, more specialized coursework
did not affect the likelihood of any of the three occupational choices6. The marginal
effects across occupations are virtually zero. Nevertheless, the broad sweep of findings from
Table 3 support hypotheses 1–3 derived from our extension of Lazear’s ‘Jack-of-all-Trades’
model to include nonprofit entrepreneurship.
To investigate the fourth hypothesis that unobservable entrepreneurial skills λn and λf
create a positive correlation in the errors of the nonprofit and for-profit equations re-
ported at the bottom of Table 3. We find that ρnf > 0 in all specifications, consistent
with the presumed common role of unobservable entrepreneurial talent. On the other
hand, regardless of specification, unobserved skills that raise the probability of either
type of entrepreneurship lower the probability of paid-employment (ρnw < 0 and ρfw < 0).
Because our tests of the “Jacks-of-all-Trades” theory represent three measures: Occu-
pations, Industries, and Course_specialization, that will be correlated if chosen to raise
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Table 3 Trivariate probit model of the joint choices of wage work and for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurship
1: No controls 2: Controls for
pre-college attributes
3: Controls for pre-labor
market entry attributes
Marginal effects
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (4.1) (4.2) (4.3)
Nonprofit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Nonprofit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Nonprofit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Non- profit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Balanced skill sets
Occupations 0.062*** (2.36) 0.191*** (11.22) −0.047*** (2.72) 0.046* (1.64) 0.157*** (8.79) −0.074*** (4.07) 0.039 (1.36) 0.150*** (8.25) −0.074*** (4.00) 0.002 0.027 −0.029
Industries 0.105*** (3.37) 0.104*** (5.45) −0.052*** (2.53) 0.084*** (2.54) 0.093*** (4.63) −0.014 (0.64) 0.076** (2.26) 0.089*** (4.35) −0.006 (0.26) 0.003 0.016 −0.019
Course_specialization 0.001 (0.22) −0.004 (1.34) 0.004 (1.39) 0.006 (1.10) −0.002 (0.51) 0.003 (0.99) 0.003 (0.46) −0.003 (0.96) 0.004 (1.20) 0.000 −0.001 0.001
Controls
Age 0.119*** (2.65) 0.062*** (3.04) −0.005 (0.27) 0.112*** (2.46) 0.052*** (2.38) −0.015 (0.69) 0.005 0.012 −0.017
Age2 −0.001** (2.18) −0.001* (1.86) −0.000 (0.05) −0.001** (1.98) −0.000 (1.29) 0.000 (0.43) −0.000 −0.000 0.000
Male 0.114 (1.41) 0.169*** (3.67) 0.485*** (10.36) 0.084 (0.96) 0.133*** (2.65) 0.433*** (8.54) 0.001 0.009 −0.010
White −0.065 (0.37) −0.249*** (2.60) 0.056 (0.54) −0.055 (0.31) −0.219** (2.26) 0.061 (0.58) −0.001 −0.037 0.038
Father education −0.034 (1.35) 0.031** (2.06) −0.059*** (3.74) −0.036 (1.41) 0.028* (1.87) −0.060*** (3.77) −0.002 0.007 −0.005
Mother education 0.017 (0.58) −0.014 (0.81) 0.028 (1.58) 0.013 (0.44) −0.015 (0.90) 0.027 (1.53) 0.001 −0.004 0.004
Either of parents
started business
0.158** (2.05) 0.190*** (4.27) −0.150*** (3.27) 0.125 (1.55) 0.155*** (3.38) −0.127*** (2.71) 0.006 0.030 −0.036
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Table 3 Trivariate probit model of the joint choices of wage work and for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurship (Continued)
1: No controls 2: Controls for
pre-college attributes
3: Controls for pre-labor
market entry attributes
Marginal effects
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (4.1) (4.2) (4.3)
Non-profit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Non-profit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Nonprofit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
Non- profit
startup
For-profit
startup
Wage
work
High school rank 0.001 (0.93) −0.003*** (4.30) 0.000 (0.51) 0.002 (1.20) −0.003*** (3.85) 0.000 (0.06) 0.000 −0.000 0.000
Married at
graduation
0.208* (1.81) 0.124* (1.74) −0.078 (1.09) 0.011 0.024 −0.035
Close friends started
business
−0.187** (2.26) −0.322*** (6.85) 0.115*** (2.43) −0.008 −0.059 0.066
Cumulative GPA 0.011 (0.15) 0.034 (0.84) −0.046 (1.08) 0.000 0.004 −0.004
College
Agriculture 0.223 (1.50) 0.015 (0.18) 0.013 (0.17) 0.012 −0.008 −0.004
Business 0.171 (1.12) 0.152* (1.82) 0.022 (0.27) 0.007 0.016 −0.023
Design 0.095 (0.59) 0.044 (0.49) 0.143* (1.68) 0.005 0.004 −0.009
Engineering 0.490*** (2.83) 0.321*** (3.09) 0.015 (0.15) 0.033 0.054 −0.086
Human sciences 0.116 (0.76) 0.092 (1.13) 0.217*** (2.69) 0.005 0.004 −0.009
Constant −2.27*** (22.0) −1.47*** (24.2) 1.23*** (19.83) −5.01*** (5.71) −2.91*** (7.11) 1.37*** (3.46) −4.96*** (5.25) −2.72*** (5.88) 1.55*** (3.41)
ρnf 0.294*** (6.81) 0.28*** (6.35) 0.28*** (6.09)
ρnW −0.39*** (16.1) −0.43*** (16.7) −0.43*** (16.7)
ρfW −0.11*** (2.38) −0.095* (1.90) −0.16*** (3.24)
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. */**/*** significance level at 10%/5%/1%, respectively.
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productivity in wage work or entrepreneurship, the individual coefficients may provide
an incorrect inference regarding their joint influence on occupational choice. Table 4
presents joint tests of the joint significance and impact of the three human capital mea-
sures. Panel A shows the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the restriction that the three mea-
sures have no effect on the probability of selecting each occupation. Panel B provides
the test that the three measures have no effect across all three occupations7. Both
within and between occupations, the LR test of joint significance soundly rejects the
null hypothesis that the three measures do not jointly affect the occupational choice.
Panel C reports the average of the estimated summed effects of the three measures on
each individual’s occupational choice8. Panel D reports tests of the hypothesis that the
summed effects equal zero. As shown in Panel C, the net effects of three measures are
positive on both nonprofit and for-profit ventures, while it is negative on paid-
employment. The LR tests in Panel D soundly reject the null hypotheses that these ef-
fects sum to zero. A unit increase in each of the three measures raises the probability
of nonprofit startups by 0.5%, raises probability of for-profit startup by 4.2%, and lowers
the probability of wage work by 4.7%.
Our results strongly support the hypothesis that nonprofit and for-profit entrepre-
neurs share similar skill requirements. Both nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs are
generalists with more balanced skill sets, while those working for pay are specialists.
Furthermore, both for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurs share common unobserved
human capital, consistent with the hypothesized roles of the entrepreneurial skill λ.
These findings are consistent with the observation that in the sample of Iowa State
University alumni, nonprofit entrepreneurs atypically had also started a for-profit busi-
ness, and vice versa.
Table 4 Joint effects of three measures (Occupations, Industries, Course_specialization)
Panel A
Within occupation (H0 : β1j = β2j = β3j = 0) Nonprofit
entrepreneurship
For-profit
entrepreneurship
Wage work
χ2(3) = 10.09 p = 0.018 χ2(3) = 122.26
p = 0.000
χ2(3) = 20.50
p = 0.000
Panel B
Across occupations
(H0 : β1j = β2j = β3j = β1k = β2k = β3k = 0) χ2(6) = 127.44
p = 0.000
Panel C
Nonprofit
entrepreneurship
For-profit
entrepreneurship
Wage work
The average effect of three measures on
individuals :
β1jX1 þ β2jX2 þ β3jX3
 
[marginal effect] 0.278 [0.005] 0.472 [0.042] −0.070
[−0.047]
Panel D
Nonprofit
entrepreneurship
For-profit
entrepreneurship
Wage work
(H0 : β1jX1 + β2jX2 + β3jX3 = 0) χ2(1) = 10.20
p = 0.0015
χ2(1) = 103.03
p = 0.0000
χ2(1) = 9.76
p = 0.0018
Note: Panel A shows the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the restriction that the three measures have no effect on the
probability of selecting each occupation. Panel B provides the test of the hypothesis across the three occupations. Panel
C shows the numerical net effect of three measures for each occupation and Panel D reports test of the hypothesis that
the sum of each effect equals zero.
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While our data are consistent with Lazear’s presumption of the role of general ver-
sus specific skills in the decision to become an entrepreneur, differences in risk aver-
sion could also explain our findings. Entrepreneurs may be less risk averse and so
they are willing to accept a higher variance in earnings in exchange for a higher ex-
pected return, although Hamilton’s (2000) finding that entrepreneurs have lower
average earnings than like-skilled employees casts doubt on arguments focused
solely on compensating differentials. An alternative is that if less risk averse people
are more likely to try new occupations, even random choice would cause one of the
occupations to be entrepreneurship. A similar taste-based explanation was advanced
by Åstebro and Thompson (2011) who argued that entrepreneurs have stronger taste
for variety and tend to have experienced more occupations at the cost of lower
earnings. These taste based arguments would predict that entrepreneurs would tend
to move in and out of the entrepreneurial occupation whereas the skill-based
arguments would suggest more persistence in the choice to be an entrepreneur.
Future studies could examine whether spells of entrepreneurship are more likely to
end than other spells, although one could just as easily explain that result with the
high mortality rate of new ventures.
6. Conclusion
In Lazear’s (2005) ‘Jacks-of-All-Trades’ model of entrepreneurship, individuals who are
broadly trained are more likely to become entrepreneurs whereas individuals with spe-
cialized skills tend to work for someone else. The entrepreneur’s more diverse skills are
important to organize the specialists they hire. We show that when Lazear’s model is
extended to the nonprofit sector, these diverse skills should also increase the likelihood
of initiating a nonprofit venture. Using successive cohorts of college graduates, we find
that a more balanced skill set increases the choice of nonprofit start-ups, supporting
our hypothesis that nonprofit entrepreneurs are also “Jacks-of-All-Trades”. In addition,
we find that unobserved factors that jointly affect for-profit and nonprofit start-ups are
positively correlated, consistent with the presence of a common observed entrepreneur-
ial skill that leads to both for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurial success. In other
words, people who are atypically more likely to start a for-profit business given their
observable skills are also more likely to start a nonprofit enterprise.
Endnotes
1Mark (1996) found that nonprofit hospitals offered higher quality services but Sloan
et al. (2001) found no significant differences in service quality between for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals.
2While Silva (2007) produces supporting evidence in cross-sectional analysis, the results
are not robust to panel techniques that control for individual unobservable factors. Silva
attributes the cross-sectional results to individual unobservable characteristics. Similarly,
Lechmann and Schnabel (2014) find that the variety of skill sets increases the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur, but they also find that entrepreneurs need both general and
specific skill sets.
3Arabsheibani et al. (2000) argue that lower returns to entrepreneurship are due to en-
trepreneurs’ over-optimism toward their future income. In other words, entrepreneurs are
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neither maximizing their income, nor their utility because they cannot make unbiased in-
come forecasts.
4Lazear shows that the basic predictions of the model still go through when human
capital has more than two subcomponents.
5We may measure a balanced skill set by number of different jobs ever held since
graduation. The number of different jobs, however, does not necessarily reflect the de-
gree of different work experience because some different jobs may be classified into the
same occupation category or they are in the same industry. Because of this possibility,
we count the total number of occupations and industries in which the jobs were lo-
cated. Nevertheless, the results are not sensitive to this alternative measure.
6An alternative measure of academic skill set is a Herfindahl index of academic credit
concentration denoted by
X
S2ij , where Sij is the share of credits earned in major j by
individual i. The results are not sensitive to this alternative measure.
7Note that because the marginal effects have to sum to zero, this hypothesis imposes
6 restrictions.
8Nearly identical estimates are generated when we sum the three effects evaluated at
sample means.
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